This paper examines the welfare implications of carbon offsets policy when some offsets supplied are nonadditional. With a simple adverse selection model, we evaluate the welfare effects of various offsets instruments, including the offset baseline, the discount rate, and an offsets limit. We then evaluate how the results change when there are constraints imposed on the regulator because of distributional considerations. We find that in general, a baseline policy is the most efficient, followed by discounting and limiting offset use. Using a calibrated numerical model representing proposed climate change legislation in the United States, we find that the distributional constraint slightly reduces the efficiency of the program but is substantially more appealing from a distributional point of view.
Introduction
When comparing environmental policy instruments, economists emphasize efficiency and cost-effectiveness. In contrast, policy makers are sometimes more concerned with the distributional impacts of policies and are willing to sacrifice efficiency to prevent undesirable distributional impacts.
These trade-offs between efficiency and distributional impacts of policies are likely to be central to the design of efficient markets for carbon offsets. Using efficiency arguments, those in favor of allowing for offsets in capand-trade programs point to reductions in the overall gross costs of these programs when offsets are included. In contrast, those concerned with emissions reductions question the ability of offsets to deliver emissions savings. These concerns arise due to an asymmetric information problem in that the regulator has imperfect information on individual firm's control costs and levels of unconstrained emissions. If the regulator sets an emissions baseline above the level of unconstrained emissions, non-additional offsets enter the market and those claiming offsets are effectively 'subsidized' while the overall level of emissions in the economy can increase. In this case, the regulator faces a classic trade-off between production efficiency and information rent extraction.
To alleviate some of the concerns, policy makers have multiple instruments at their disposal: (a) more stringent emissions baselines for uncapped sectors; (b) discount factors for offsets relative to allowances; (c) a limit in the use of offsets for compliance; (d) more stringent caps on emissions of regulated firms. Each of these optionstaken individually or in combinations of multiple instruments -can generate different efficiency and distributional outcomes. Yet, to date, our knowledge of the trade-offs that policy makers face when choosing amongst these various instruments to design efficient markets for carbon offsets is limited. This paper aims to fill this important gap in the literature.
Specifically, we ask the following two questions: First, what are the welfare effects associated with the optimal combination of instruments to design efficient markets for carbon offsets when the regulator has imperfect information on control costs and emissions? Second, what are the efficiency costs associated with restricting the number of instruments available to the regulator due, in part, to potentially undesirable distributional concerns?
We investigate these issues with both analytical and numerical models. Our analytical model incorporates the behavior of capped and uncapped sectors and explicitly considers the problem of asymmetric information that the regulator faces in terms of his knowledge of control costs and unconstrained emissions. The regulator has four instruments: The regulated sector emissions cap, a common unregulated sector emissions baseline, an offsets discount rate, and an offsets limit. Our analytical model enables us to obtain general results regarding the determinants of efficiency impacts and distribution of policy costs. These results are then evaluated quantitatively with the numerical model.
We find that, in a setting when policy makers do not observe unconstrained emissions or control costs of uncapped sectors, they can still achieve the first-best outcome provided that they have two instruments to them.
In this case, they should assign a sufficiently high emissions baseline to uncapped firms so that all uncapped firms are encouraged to supply offsets and set a more stringent cap (relative to a world with perfect information) to regulated firms that accounts for the quantity of offsets that are non-additional. This result is similar to those of Kwerel (1977) , Dasgupta et al. (1980) , Spulber (1988) and Montero (2000) in that information asymmetries may not prevent the regulator from achieving social optimum.
Of course the major obstacle with this prescription is that a substantial distributional burden is placed on capped sectors. A stringent cap to restore the first-best when the regulator has imperfect information effectively means that the regulated sector is fully subsidizing the production of non-additional offsets. In fact, to sustain this first-best outcome, a large revenue transfer must happen from capped to uncapped sectors. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that the regulator will have the ability to set a more stringent cap due to political and distributional constraints.
In a second-best world with imperfect information and when regulators are forced to keep the cap on regulated firms fixed, our results suggest that based on efficiency grounds, more stringent emissions baselines to uncapped sectors are more cost-effective policies to reduce emissions than increasing the offsets discount rate of establishing a binding cap on offsets use. This is because, while more stringent baselines effectively discourage both the production of non-additional and additional offsets, higher offsets discount rates only crowd out the production of additional offsets and fail to reduce the production of non-additional offsets. Relative to the case where the regulator has two instruments available under imperfect information -the regulated sector emissions cap and the unregulated sector baseline -we find that the second-best optimal baseline policy alone is slightly less cost-effective but it can be substantially more appealing from a distributional point of view. In fact, in this second-best case, our simulation results suggest that, for each dollar of efficiency sacrificed (relative to a world where the cap could have been adjusted), the optimal second-best baseline policy avoids 3.4 dollars of rents from being transferred from capped to uncapped sectors.
Our work contributes to two separate bodies of literature. The first is the effectiveness of environmental policies with asymmetric information. The second involves the welfare costs of distributional constraints. Recent developments have investigated the efficiency costs of meeting distributional constrains across industries (Bovenburg et al. 2005) . This is especially important for our study because the potential transfers of rents will occur between diverse industries, in particular the power sector and the agricultural sector.
The remaining sectors of the paper are the following. In section 2, we present the analytical model and key welfare formulas. Section 3 formulates the numerical model that we use to establish magnitudes of the marginal effects derived in Section 2. Section 4 provides sensitivity analysis of the key results and Section 5 concludes.
Analytical Model
Our analytical model is based on a model formulated by Montero (2000) , which provides a simple representation of the asymmetric information problem associated with offsets. Consider an environment where there are two sectors the produce emissions, each represented by a unit mass of firms:
• Firms in the regulated sector must hold an allowance or an offset for each unit of pollution they emit.
• Firms in the unregulated sector may earn offset payments by opting into the program.
The model lasts for two periods, denoted by period 0 and period 1. In period 0, all of the firms in each sector have the same emissions of e0. In period 1, firm i has unconstrained emissions e i , which are expected to be e0, but they can be less than, equal to or greater. Firms are also differentiated by marginal costs of abatement, c i .
The values of e i and c i are firm i s private information. The regulator does not observe e i or c i but observes density functions for each variable.
For the unregulated sector, we assume e i ∈ [e, e] and that each e i is independently and identically distributed according to the cumulated distribution function Y (e) with mean e0. Marginal costs satisfy c i ∈ [c, c] and are independently and identically distributed according to the cumulative distribution function Z(c) with mean c0. In the unregulated sector, abatement can come in the form of emissions reductions or increased levels of sequestration.
For simplicity, we do not distinguish between the two practices. We assume that abatement is equivalent to net reductions, which equals emissions reductions plus increases in sequestration. The distributions of e i and c i for the regulated sector do not play a role in our analysis and are therefore not specified in this section.
The model has the following timing. In period 0, the regulator sets values for four instruments. They select a reduction target for regulated firms, q, unregulated firm baselines, b i , the offsets discount rate, δ, and the offsets limit, L. The reduction target for regulated firms is achieved through an allocation of permits A, so that q = e0 − A, where e0 is the level of unconstrained emissions in the regulated sector. Since the regulator cannot differentiate between firms, they assign a single baseline, b, to all unregulated firms that decide to opt into the program. In period 1, after observing their own unconstrained emissions, market prices for allowances and offsets, firms make abatement and opt-in decisions.
Regulated firm problem
From the assumption that firms have constant marginal costs of abatement, regulated firm i's optimal solution is to either abate none or all of its emissions. If it does not abate its emissions, it must hold enough allowances and offsets to account for its emissions. The regulated firm's problem is
If the firm abates, they incur an abatement cost of c i e i . They also earn revenue paa i by selling its permit endowment a i at the equilibrium permit price pa. If the firm does not abate, they incur a cost equal to the minimized value of permit and offset purchases that are necessary to satisfy their emissions constraint (2). The constraint (2) requires that firm i holds a quantity of purchased permits, a, a discounted value of offsets, f 1+δ , and its original permit allocation a i to cover its emissions e i .
Discounting forces the firm to buy more offsets per unit of emissions. When a firm buys f offsets, only
can be used to account for e i . In other words, the firm must buy f = 1 + δ offsets for every one unit of emissions it wishes to cover. The offsets limit, represented by constraint (3), prevents the firm from depending too much on offsets to comply with the program.
The first-order condition of the sub-minimization problem implies a relationship between the offsets price and the permit price:
In (4), λ(L) is the multiplier from the limit constraint (3) and is nonnegative. The first component of p f equates the value of a permit and the value of an offset. Discounting lowers the value of an offset in proportion to the discount rate δ and the equilibrium permit price pa. The second component of p f depends on the value of the limit multiplier. A positive value of λ(L) implies a binding offsets limit, which reduces the equilibrium price of offsets. For the offsets market to clear, the offsets price takes on the smaller value of the two components. 
Unregulated firm problem
Similar to the regulated firm problem, the problem of the unregulated firm is to choose complete abatement or no abatement. Unlike the regulated firm problem, the unregulated firm maximizes profits in its decision. Unregulated
If unregulated firm i abates, they earn offsets payments of p f b, or the equilibrium offset price multiplied by the baseline. They also incur an abatement cost of c i e i . If unregulated firm i does not abate, they earn offsets payments if their unconstrained emissions are lower than the common baseline, e i < b. The general behavior of unregulated firms is illustrated in Figure 1 . The horizontal axis measures marginal abatement costs of unregulated > pa − λ(L). This contradicts the demand for offsets first-order condition,
. In this case the offsets limit is binding. But because p f > pa 1+δ , there is no demand for offsets, since the converted offsets price exceeds the permit price, which is a contradiction.
but sell offsets because their unconstrained emissions are lower than the baseline. The curve separating areas A1 and A3, e(c), represents those firms that are indifferent between supplying offsets and not supplying offsets. The curve is given by
For any baseline choice b > e, there will be a positive supply of non-additional offsets, ENA, coming from firms in areas A4 and A5.
The regulator's problem
We adopt the standard definition of the first best solution as the case where marginal abatement costs are equalized across sectors and equal the marginal benefit of abatement. To achieve the first best, the regulator chooses values for the instruments {q, b, δ, L} to maximize net welfare, which we define as the difference between abatement benefits and abatement costs. The regulator's problem is
The terms ENA, EA+, qu and Cu are various emissions effects, unregulated firm abatement and costs which are defined as
The value EA+ is the quantity of abatement that is not measured as an offset. The quantity comes from firms that abate emissions but are under-compensated with a baseline that is lower than their unconstrained level of emissions. The value ENA is the supply of non-additional offsets. qu is the quantity of abatement by unregulated firms.
2 The value Cu is the cost of emissions reductions by unregulated firms. Before we solve (7), we analyze the differences between the instruments graphically to obtain a better sense of how they influence unregulated firm decisions. We first focus on how adjusting the baseline changes the incentives of unregulated firms. Figure 2 illustrates the effect of marginally adjusting the baseline down from b to b . A more stringent baseline influences Figure 2 : The effect of a more stringent baseline unregulated firm behavior on two fronts. First, area A1 increases because the profit from opting in to the program has decreased, discouraging some firms from producing offsets. This has the effect of reducing the production of additional offsets. Second, less non-additional offsets are sold as areas A4 and A5 shrink. The two effects constitute a tradeoff: A more stringent baseline crowds out the supply of real emissions reductions but also lowers the supply of fake offsets.
Next we consider adjusting the discount rate or the offsets limit. Adjusting either of these instruments has the same general effect on unregulated firm behavior because both affect the offsets price directly. A higher discount rate or a lower offsets limit inserts a wedge between the permit price and the offsets price. Holding the permit price constant, a positive discount rate or a binding limit on offsets lowers the offsets price. This effect is illustrated in Figure 3 . A higher discount rate or a lower limit reduces the offsets price from p f to p f . A lower Figure 3 : The effect of a higher discount rate or a lower limit price influences unregulated firm behavior in two margins. The first margin is that firms must now have a lower marginal cost of abatement to opt in, shown by the leftward shift in the vertical offsets price line. The second margin is that the profit indifference line shifts down as firms earn less profit from opting in. Both margins lower the supply of additional offsets, but neither discourages the supply of non-additional offsets, a feature which will play a paramount role in determining the relative effectiveness across the various instruments.
These effects can be further established with key welfare formulas 3 that come from the first-order conditions of the regulator problem (7). The first-order condition for the baseline can be simplified to
There are three effects associated with a marginal change in the baseline. First, dW N A is the non-additional effect. Increasing the baseline reduces compliance costs of the regulated sector as they can use a greater supply of non-additional offsets. A higher supply of non-additional offsets lowers welfare from emissions because of higher emissions. Second, dW A+ is the additional plus effect. Increasing the baseline changes the quantity of additional plus reductions, which may increase or decrease the supply of offsets. If additional-plus reductions increase and unregulated sector abatement is held constant, then the supply of offsets decreases, which raises compliance costs.
A higher quantity of additional-plus reductions lowers overall emissions and thus raises welfare. Third, dW T is gains-from-trade effect. Increasing the baseline encourages the participation of unregulated firms. Transactions between unregulated and regulated firms increase welfare.
The first-order condition for the discount rate can be simplified to
There are three effects associated with discounting. First, dW D is the primary discounting effect. Discounting raises abatement costs to the regulated sector because they must hold more offsets per unit of emissions. It also lowers overall emissions, which raises abatement benefits. Second, dW A+ is the additional plus effect. Discounting changes the quantity of additional plus reductions, which may increase or decrease the supply of offsets. If additional-plus reductions increase and unregulated sector abatement is held constant, then the supply of offsets decreases, which raises compliance costs. A higher quantity of additional-plus reductions lowers overall emissions and thus raises welfare. Third, dW T is the gains-from-trade effect. A offset limit discourages the participation of unregulated firms on two margins. The first margin is the indifference line separating firms that have marginal costs less than the offsets price. The second margin is the indifference line separating firms that earn positive rents from participating in the program.
The first-order condition for the offsets limit can be simplified to
There are two effects associated with adjusting a binding limit on offsets. First, dW A+ is the additional plus effect.
An offsets limit changes the quantity of additional plus reductions, which may increase or decrease the supply of offsets. If additional-plus reductions increase and unregulated sector abatement is held constant, then the supply of offsets decreases, which raises compliance costs. A higher quantity of additional-plus reductions lowers overall emissions and thus raises welfare. Second, dW T is the gains-from-trade effect. Limiting offsets discourages the participation of unregulated firms on two margins. The first margin is the indifference line separating firms that have marginal costs less than the offsets price. The second margin is the indifference line separating firms that earn positive rents from participating in the program.
We summarize the differences across the instruments in Table 1 . In Table 1 , we consider a marginal reduc- Figures 2 and 3 , we see that the baseline is the only instrument that reduces the supply of non-additional offsets. 4 The term dW T exists in each welfare formula, which represents the discouragement of additional offsets production. Another difference across the instruments is how they influence additional plus reductions. While the effect of a more stringent baseline is ambiguous, the discount rate and the limit both reduce the quantity of additional plus reductions. Finally, the effect of the instruments on total emissions is the same from the baseline and the discount rate: Both reduce emissions, albeit in different ways. The baseline directly reduces emissions by eliminating some of the supply of non-additional offsets. The discount rate reduces emissions by forcing regulated firms to purchase more offsets than the quantity that are used to cover emissions. The offsets limit, however, does not reduce emissions, but instead increases emissions. As the offsets limit depresses the offsets price, the quantity of additional-plus reductions falls, raising emissions. As this is the only emissions effect associated with the limit, emissions increase as a result.
In the next section, we use the intuition of the differences between the instruments to derive how the regulator can achieve the first best solution.
Achieving the first best
The first-order condition of (7) for the reduction target q is B (·) = Cr(·) = pa. Substituting into the baseline condition (12) and setting equal to zero defines a condition for the optimal baseline:
The condition requires that the baseline be adjusted to the point where no more gains from trade can be made between the regulated and unregulated firms. When b ≤ e, some unregulated firms with c i ≤ p f are not supplying offsets, which means there exist gains from trade between the two sectors that are not being exploited. Condition (15) is met when b = e. When b = e, the supply of non-additional offsets is ENA = e − e0. To achieve the first best, the regulator adjusts the reduction target q from q * to q * + (e − e0), where q * would have been the reduction target had all offsets been additional. The adjustment of the reduction target lowers the allocation of permits to regulated firms.
With the first best achieved through adjusting the two instruments q and b, setting a positive discount rate or a binding limit becomes unnecessary. then the total quantity of abatement remains at q ru . When some unregulated firms receive baselines higher than their unconstrained emissions, non-additional offsets are supplied to regulated firms. Denoting the supply of non-additional offsets by ENA, realized abatement is q − ENA. The first best can be restored by increasing the abatement target by ENA through lowering the allocation of permits to regulated firms by ENA. Realized abatement therefore shifts back to q ru , the first best level of abatement.
Our result is similar to the proposition in Montero (2000) . Montero analyzes an asymmetric information problem in the context of the Clean Air Act sulfur dioxide cap-and-trade program. Some firms must hold an emissions permit for each unit of emissions while others can voluntarily opt in to the program. Given that the policy maker cannot observe unconstrained emissions, the same adverse selection problem arises: Unregulated firms that are given an allocation above their unconstrained emissions are more likely to opt in and receive excess compensation. Montero finds that the policy maker can still achieve the first best allocation with asymmetric information if they can adjust both the allocation to affect and unaffected firms. The adjustment is to lower the allocation of permits to affected firms and raise the allocation to unaffected firms until all unaffected firms opt in.
Our result extends Montero's with additional of two instruments that are germane to offsets policy, the offset discount rate and the limit. The result that the efficient instrument choice has no discounting and a non-binding limit relates to the result in public finance that indirect taxation is unnecessary when more direct instruments are available to the regulator. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) prove that when the government has access to non-linear income taxes, commodity taxes are redundant. In our model, the baseline is the direct source of the additionality problem, while discounting or an offsets limit are indirect methods of accounting for non-additional offsets. As a consequence, we find that discounting or limiting offsets is superfluous when the regulator can adjust the baseline.
Distributional implications
The mechanism for achieving the first best leads to a significant transfer of rents. Figure 2 illustrates the magnitude of the transfer. Lowering the allocation of permits by ENA transfers a value equal to the rectangle DKLM away from the regulated sector to the unregulated sector. The decrease in permits to the regulated sector increases welfare by the triangle DKI, a value less than the rent transfer.
Goulder and Parry (2008) review the distortions and distributional consequences associated with different types of environmental policies, including the use of direct instruments (emissions taxes and permits) and indirect instruments (technology mandates, performance standards and development subsidies). They conclude that more direct instruments are more efficient but often lead to greater distributional disparities between those affected by the program. When a policy has significant distributional impacts, it may not be feasible to implement because of political frictions. In our model, we can define the cost of a distributional constraint as the welfare cost per dollar of avoided transfer, which is given by the formula ∆W ∆rents .
The term ∆W is defined as the non-marginal change in welfare between the two policies, where one policy has a distributional constraint imposed while the other does not. We consider one particular distributional constraint:
Restricting the choice of the reduction target q. The reduction target determines the quantity of permits allocated to covered firms, which represent rents generated from the program. The higher the allocation of rents given to the regulated firms, the greater the probability that the program will pass. Making such a restriction allows us to analyze the trade-off between efficiency costs and distributional effects of offsets policy. Since the welfare cost per dollar of avoided transfer is a measurement of a non-marginal change, we use a numerical model in the following sector to quantity of the trade-off in addition to evaluating the welfare differences across the instruments.
Numerical Model
We now supplement the analytical model developed above with a numerical model calibrated to represent a United States cap and trade program with carbon offsets. The numerical model illustrates the welfare differences across the instruments, provides magnitudes of the trade-offs between efficiency and distributional concerns and evaluates optimal instrument choices under the second best setting.
Model Calibration
The analytical model is calibrated with values that represent a short-run window (2010-2020) of the proposed United States cap and trade program. For simplicity, we assume that marginal costs and unconstrained emissions are uniformly distributed. Table 1 provides values used to calibrate parameters of the model and Table 2 summarizes the implied parameter values. Notes: *-Evaluated at a carbon price of 25 dollars. Emissions units inventory. We assume that the unregulated sector is comprised of agriculture and forestry so that the sum of the two sources equal the value provided in Table 2 . Since the agricultural and forestry sectors have negative net emissions, unconstrained emissions appear as a negative value.
The abatement values are used to calibrate the slopes of the marginal costs curves for each sector. We evaluate the slope of the marginal abatement cost schedules at 25 dollars. Regulated sector abatement is computed with a two-step process that uses simulation output from the EPA's June 2010 analysis of the APA. The first state is to attain an approximation of the regulated sector total abatement cost curve, which is calculated by fitting a convex curve through simulation output of the EPA analysis. Non-linear least squares generates an abatement cost curve that yields an abatement quantity of 1,185 when the marginal cost of abatement equals 25 dollars. Values in Table 2 are used to identify values of the model. Given that the distributions of both firm characteristics are uniform, the cost of abatement function for both sectors takes the form
where C is the cost of abatement and q is the quantity of abatement. For both sectors we scale the marginal cost of abatement so that c = 0. Doing so simplifies the cost functions to
To identify the upper bound of the marginal cost distributions, we compute the marginal cost function and solve for c:
Substituting observed abatement at a carbon price of 25 dollars -which equals the marginal cost of abatement -and mean emissions for each sectors allows us to solve for c.
Unconstrained emissions heterogeneity among regulated firms does not influence the results of our analysis.
Therefore we assume that there is a point mass on the unconstrained emissions distribution for regulated firms so that e = e = e0 = 5, 071. Unconstrained emissions heterogeneity among unregulated firms influences the supply of non-additional offsets. We use a simple algorithm that calibrates the bounds of unconstrained emissions such that the resulting bounds induce the proportion of non-additional offsets relative to the total offset supply to equal 40 percent given an exogenous carbon price of 25 dollars. The algorithm uses an initial set of bounds to calculate the prevailing percentage of non-additional offsets. If the percentage does not equal 40 percent, it updates the bounds and continues this process until the percent equals 40 percent.
The implied parameter values reveal a few points worth highlighting. First, the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve in the regulated sector is about twice as shallow as the slope in the unregulated sector, which implies that a majority of abatement is expected to come from covered firms. Second, the gains from allowing offsets will be significant given that the upper bound of marginal costs is lower in the unregulated sector. Both of these points are illustrated in Table 4 which presents implied marginal abatement cost schedules of the two sectors.
The marginal abatement cost of the regulated sector is lower than that of the unregulated sector by about 50 
Numerical results
Tables 5 and 6 present the central welfare results. Table 5 shows welfare effects for five different settings: No offsets, full information with a sub-optimal permit allocation, full information with an optimal allowance allocation, imperfect information with a sub-optimal permit allocation and baseline and imperfect information with an optimal permit allocation and baseline. The column with the heading No offsets has values that are in millions offsets to a world with full information and a sub-optimal permit allocation increases net welfare by 32 percent as a result of compliance costs falling by 32 percent. The increase in welfare is illustrated by the region GEIJ in Figure 4 , which represents the reduction in compliance costs. Moving to the full information setting with an optimized permit allocation increases welfare by 45 percent. Compliance costs increase in this setting because the regulator makes the reduction target more stringent by cutting the permit allocation to covered firms. The reduction target moves out from q u to q ru , raising compliance costs by the difference between areas FEHJ and JKMN in Figure 4 . Overall welfare increases because of a large abatement benefit increase, represented by area EKMN.
Moving to the perfect information setting with a sub-optimal cap and baseline still raises welfare, but not as much as in the perfect information setting. Compliance costs fall by 40 percent as both additional and nonadditional offsets enter the program. The effect of additional offsets on compliance costs is given by the shift down in the marginal abatement cost curve and is represented by the region FGIH. The effect of non-additional offsets on compliance costs is given by the shift to the left of the realized abatement requirement, which lowers compliance costs by area GELM. Abatement benefits are reduced because of the reduction requirement is compromised by the supply of non-additional offsets. The welfare loss is given by the area DELM in Figure 4 . The net result of all three effects is an increase in net welfare of 21 percent. When the regulator can optimize over the first best instrument, they can achieve maximum (first best) welfare. Welfare increases by 45 percent, identical to the increase in the full information, optimal instrument choice setting.
Next we consider second best settings when the regulator takes as given the permit allocation to regulated firms. Table 6 presents the key welfare and instrument choice results from the numerical model. Table 6 shows Welfare is highest under the setting when the baseline is optimized, achieving a 25 percent welfare increase relative to the no offsets setting. Under this setting, it is sub-optimal to discount or set a binding limit. When the baseline is fixed, the regulator finds it optimal to discount offsets at a rate of 30 percent, which corresponds to a 1.3:1 trade ratio between offsets and permits. Doing so raises welfare above the setting without a discount rate by 2 percentage points. Under all the settings, a binding offsets limit is sub-optimal.
The welfare results can be further understood by viewing how emissions and offset supply differ across the settings. Table 7 presents key model outputs for these variables. settings. Moving from the no offsets setting to the first best, we see a tightening of the abatement target (through a lowering of the permit allocation) and a large increase in the supply of both additional and non-additional offsets.
A comparison of the three second best policies provides intuition for where the sources of welfare difference arise.
As shown in the analytical model, adjusting the discount rate or the limit does not alter the supply of nonadditional offsets, which remain fixed at 181 untis for these two settings. Meanwhile, optimizing over the baseline significantly reduces the supply of non-additional offsets by about 40 percent. Total offset supply is substantially lower in the baseline setting because the supply of non-additional offsets is lower.
Next we consider the distributional aspect of the numerical results. The regulated sector rents are calculated by multiplying the equilibrium permit price and the permit allocation.
The welfare change output measures the welfare loss from the distributional constraint, and is measured as the first best welfare minus the welfare achieved under another setting. The avoided transfer output measures the difference in rents to the regulated sector. The no offsets and two of the second best settings report a relatively low ratio, all being below 0.42. The no offsets setting with an optimized baseline has the lowest ratio of 0.29, implying that the regulator gives up 29 cents per dollar of avoided transfer. An alternative interpretation of this value is that the optimal second-best baseline policy avoids 3.4 dollars of rents from being transferred from capped to uncapped sectors.
4 Sensitivity Analysis Table 9 summarizes the sensitivity of the numerical results over a range of values for important parameters.
The sensitivity analysis reveals two results. First, Under all parameter values, it is never optimal to discount offsets whenever the baseline is available. In the second best setting when the regulator cannot adjust the permit allocation but has access to the baseline, discount rate and limit, they find it optimal to set the discount rate equal to zero, regardless of the social cost of carbon, the percent of offsets that are non-additional or the steepness of the marginal cost curve for the unregulated sector. Second, the welfare cost of avoiding a dollar of transfers is generally low for the setting when the baseline can be adjusted or when there are no offsets allowed in the cap and trade program. Without offsets, the ratio is less than 0.3 for all the different parameter values. In the second best setting, the ratio is less than 0.6 as long as the regulator can optimize over the baseline.
Conclusions
This paper uses a simple adverse selection model to decompose the welfare and distributional effects of various offsets instruments in the presence of distributional constraints. The model assumes that the regulator cannot observe unconstrained emissions or control costs of offset providers and therefore must select a common baseline for those that wish to opt in to the program. As a result, non-additional offsets are supplied. In choosing optimal policy, the regulator faces a classic trade-off between encouraging greater participation in the program and increasing emissions through over-compensating firms that opt in and have unconstrained emissions lower than their assigned baseline.
We found that although the regulator can achieve maximum welfare even with asymmetric information on control costs and unconstrained emissions, doing so requires a substantial distributional burden, where rents are transferred away from the regulated sector to the unregulated sector. Under the distributional constraint that the regulator cannot adjust the allocation of permits to regulated firms, we derived and simulated the welfare effects of alternative instruments including the offsets discount rate and the offsets limit.
In a second best world, adjusting the baseline assigned to unregulated firms is the most efficient mechanism and generally prevents the most transfers from happening. We attribute this result to the fact that the baseline is
Proof that discounting and and offsets limit are unnecessary to achieve the first best
Proof. With a discount rate of zero and a non-binding limit on offsets, welfare is written as W = B(q − ENA − EA+) − Cr(q − ENA − qu − EA+) − Cu,
Differentiating with respect to these instruments yields ∂W ∂q = B (·) − C r (·) = 0,
where f is the supply of offsets, f = ENA + qu + EA+. To prove the claim, we show that the first best discount factor is equal to one, which implies that the first best discount rate equals zero. Substituting the offset supply expression into (21) lets us write welfare as
Differentiating welfare with respect to the discount rate gives
In the first best solution, pa = B (·), so that the derivative is simplified to ∂W ∂δ = B (·) ∂qu ∂δ − ∂Cu ∂δ , limit on offsets. Welfare with a discount rate of zero and an arbitrary limit on offsets, l, is given by W = B(q − ENA − EA+) − Cr(q − ENA − qu − EA+) − Cu.
A binding limit on the supply of offsets puts a wedge between the price of offsets and the price of allowances. The price of offsets is pushed down until total offsets supply equals the limit, so that p f < pa. Similar to adjusting the discount rate, adjusting the limit on offsets directly affects the price of offsets to insure that the prevailing quantity supplied equals the limit. Differentiating welfare with respect to the limit and substituting C r (·) = pa
In the first best solution, pa = B (·). Substituting yields ∂W ∂l = pa ∂qu ∂l − ∂Cu ∂l
When the limit is binding, adjusting the limit up one unit increases the quantity of abatement by one unit, so that ∂qu ∂l = 1. Substituting gives ∂W ∂l = pa − ∂Cu ∂l
Since adjusting the limit up one unit increases the quantity of abatement by one unit, the term . Substituting yields ∂W ∂l = pa − p f .
The first best limit on offsets is defined by setting the above equation to zero, which implies pa = p f .
Any binding limit on offsets reduces the offsets price below the permit price, which implies that a binding limit on offsets cannot satisfy the welfare-maximizing condition. When the offsets limit is non-binding and the other instruments are optimized, we have pa = p f . Hence, the optimal limit on offsets is a non-binding one.
